Rethinking Corporate Governance: A Comparison of Agency, Stakeholder, and Cognitive Approaches
1Ifiss Saida, 2Mssassi Said
1,2The National School of Business and Management, Abdelmalek Essaâdi University, Tangier, Morocco
https://doi.org/10.47191/jefms/v7-i10-16ABSTRACT:
This article analyzes three main theories of corporate governance: agency theory, partnership theory and cognitive theory. Agency theory focuses on control mechanisms designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between owners and managers. In response to the limitations of this approach, partnership theory broadens the perspective by taking into account a wider set of stakeholders, while emphasizing the need for ethical and collaborative governance. Cognitive theory, meanwhile, emphasizes the importance of learning and innovation in creating value within organizations. The article provides a comparative analysis of these three theories, identifying their convergences and divergences, as well as their relevance to current governance practices. This reflection shows that these theories, far from being mutually exclusive, offer complementary perspectives for developing more inclusive governance mechanisms, capable of responding to contemporary challenges while integrating the economic, social and cognitive dimensions of organizational performance.
KEYWORDS:
Corporate Governance, Agency Theory, Partnership Theory, Cognitive Theory, Stakeholder Management
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