

When the Algorithm Watches But No One Listens: Employee Voice as a Buffer Against the Well-Being Costs of HR Analytics-Based Performance Monitoring A Systematic Integrative Review and Theoretical Framework

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ABSTRACT

Purpose. This article investigates whether employee voice moderates the well-being costs of analytics-based performance monitoring, integrating three literatures that have evolved in near-complete isolation: HR analytics, employee voice, and workplace well-being under algorithmic management.

Design/methodology/approach. We conduct a systematic integrative review following PRISMA 2020 guidelines. Searches across Scopus, Web of Science, and Business Source Complete yielded 1,247 records; 63 studies published between 2015 and 2025 were retained for thematic synthesis.

Findings. Analytics-based monitoring is consistently associated with reduced autonomy, heightened stress, and diminished trust, while employee voice mechanisms are associated with procedural justice and improved well-being. Yet only four of 63 retained studies examine monitoring and voice jointly, and none mobilize an integrated theoretical framework.

Originality. We develop an integrative framework combining job demands-resources theory with organizational justice theory, advancing five testable propositions that specify how and when voice attenuates monitoring's negative effects. This is the first systematic review to treat the monitoring-voice-well-being nexus as a unified object of inquiry.

KEYWORDS: HR analytics, employee voice, performance monitoring, employee well-being, organizational justice, algorithmic management, systematic review

1. INTRODUCTION

Organizations that deploy HR analytics to monitor employee performance rarely ask what that monitoring does to the people being monitored. The question is not rhetorical. Across the European Union, roughly one in four establishments now uses data analytics for performance monitoring (Bechter, Brandl, & Lehr, 2022). In warehouses, call centers, hospitals, and corporate offices, algorithmic systems track productivity metrics, flag deviations, and generate evaluations that shape careers. The scholarly response to this expansion has been energetic but lopsided. A substantial literature now explains why organizations adopt analytics-based monitoring: they do so because they possess the structural capability, face competitive pressure, and operate within institutional environments that permit it (Angrave et al., 2016; Bechter et al., 2022; Margherita, 2021). What happens after adoption, to the people whose performance the analytics measure, has received far less systematic attention.

Terminological clarification is necessary before proceeding. We use 'analytics-based performance monitoring' to refer to the use of data analytics tools, dashboards, scoring algorithms, and real-time tracking systems to measure, evaluate, and manage employee performance within conventional employment relationships. This overlaps with, but is not identical to, algorithmic management, a broader concept encompassing all algorithmic functions that affect work, including task allocation, scheduling, and evaluation, whether or not analytics are involved (Kellogg, Valentine, & Christin, 2020). Where we discuss findings from the algorithmic management literature that pertain specifically to monitoring and evaluation functions, we use the broader term. Our propositions target analytics-based monitoring specifically.

This asymmetry is not merely an oversight in the research agenda. It reflects deeper conceptual limitations. The HR analytics literature has developed overwhelmingly from the standpoint of the adopting organization: its capabilities, its returns,

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its strategic alignment (Marler & Boudreau, 2017; McCartney & Fu, 2022). The employee, the individual whose daily work is quantified, scored, and fed back through algorithmic channels, appears in this literature as an input to the analytics process rather than as a subject affected by it. Parallel to this, a critical literature on algorithmic management has documented the well-being costs of digital monitoring, including reduced autonomy, heightened stress, and occupational health risks (Carter et al., 2013; Kellogg et al., 2020; Parent-Rochelleau & Parker, 2022). And a third literature, on employee voice, has shown that mechanisms enabling workers to express concerns and participate in decisions can buffer them against adverse working conditions (Morrison, 2023; Wilkinson, Dundon, Donaghey, & Freeman, 2020). These three literatures share obvious thematic connections. They have almost never been connected.

This article bridges them. We address the following research question: *how does employee voice, in its direct and collective forms, moderate the relationship between analytics-based performance monitoring and employee well-being, and through what mechanism does this moderation operate?*

We conduct a systematic integrative review of 63 studies published between 2015 and 2025 to map the well-being consequences of analytics-based and algorithmic performance monitoring, the role of employee voice in algorithmic management, and the lack of intersection between these domains. On the basis of this synthesis, we develop an integrative theoretical framework combining job demands-resources (JD-R) theory (Bakker & Demerouti, 2017; Bakker, Demerouti, & Sanz-Vergel, 2023) and organizational justice theory (Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal, 1980) to explain how and why employee voice attenuates the well-being costs of analytics-based monitoring. Five formal propositions are advanced.

The article makes three contributions. First, it is the first systematic review to treat the monitoring-voice-well-being nexus as a unified object of inquiry, revealing both the empirical patterns that connect these domains and the theoretical gap that has prevented their integration. Second, it constructs a framework that specifies the mechanism through which voice operates in monitored environments: the restoration of procedural justice conditions that algorithmic authority structurally undermines. Third, it provides a detailed research agenda, with testable propositions and operationalizable constructs, that can guide the next generation of empirical work. The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the review methodology. Section 3 presents the thematic synthesis. Section 4 develops the theoretical framework and propositions. Section 5 discusses implications and limitations. Section 6 concludes.

2. REVIEW METHODOLOGY

2.1 Review design and protocol

We adopted a systematic integrative review design (Torraco, 2005), which is appropriate when the objective is to synthesise and critically assess literature from multiple, previously disconnected research streams and to generate new theoretical insights from that synthesis. Unlike meta-analyses, which require comparable effect sizes across studies, integrative reviews accommodate diverse research designs, including quantitative, qualitative, and conceptual work. We followed the PRISMA 2020 reporting guidelines (Page et al., 2021) to ensure transparency and replicability. The review protocol was not prospectively registered with PROSPERO. The search strategy, inclusion criteria, and synthesis approach were pre-specified before searches were conducted and are fully documented in the sections that follow. A completed PRISMA 2020 checklist is available from the corresponding author upon request.

2.2 Search strategy

We searched three databases: Scopus, Web of Science (Core Collection), and Business Source Complete (via EBSCOhost). The initial systematic search was conducted in January 2025 and covered publications from January 2015 to January 2025. A supplementary forward-citation and alert-based search was conducted in June 2025 to capture studies published after the initial search date. This supplementary stage identified four additional studies that met the inclusion criteria and were incorporated into the corpus (Adhami & Timur, 2025; Deng, Lu, Fan, Liu, & Xia, 2025; the AMOSH logistics study, 2025; Van Zoonen, von Bonsdorff, & van der Heijden, 2025). We used three search strings, corresponding to the three literatures we aimed to integrate. The first targeted HR analytics and performance monitoring: ("HR analytics" OR "people analytics" OR "workforce analytics" OR "human resource analytics") AND ("performance monitoring" OR "performance management" OR "employee monitoring" OR "surveillance"). The second targeted algorithmic management and well-being: ("algorithmic management" OR "algorithmic control" OR "digital monitoring") AND ("well-being" OR "wellbeing" OR "stress" OR "burnout" OR "engagement" OR "health"). The third targeted employee voice in digitally mediated contexts: ("employee voice" OR "worker voice" OR "employee participation" OR "works council" OR "employee representation") AND ("algorithm*" OR "analytics" OR "digital" OR "AI" OR "artificial intelligence") AND ("HRM" OR "human resource" OR "work" OR "employment").

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2.3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria

Studies were included if they were published in peer-reviewed journals or as chapters in edited volumes from academic publishers, were written in English, addressed at least one of the three thematic domains (analytics-based monitoring and its consequences, employee voice under algorithmic management, or the intersection of monitoring, voice, and well-being), and contained empirical findings or developed substantive theoretical frameworks grounded in prior evidence. Studies were excluded if they focused exclusively on adoption determinants without addressing employee-level consequences, were limited to gig economy platforms without reference to conventional employment or were purely technical papers on algorithm design without organizational or human implications.

The exclusion of studies confined to gig economy platforms reflects a theoretically motivated boundary decision. The employment relationship in platform work differs structurally from conventional employment: gig workers typically lack the institutional voice mechanisms, works councils, trade union representation, and formal participation schemes that constitute the moderating variable in our framework. Including platform-only studies would conflate two fundamentally different governance structures and weaken the internal validity of the theoretical argument developed in Section 4. Studies that examined both platform and conventional employment were retained if they reported findings applicable to the conventional employment context.

2.4 Screening and selection

The initial systematic search returned to 1,247 records (487 from Scopus, 412 from Web of Science, 348 from Business Source Complete). After removing 389 duplicates, 858 records were screened by title and abstract. Of these, 174 were retained for full-text assessment. Following full-text review, 59 studies met the inclusion criteria. The supplementary search (June 2025) added four studies, bringing the total to 63 studies retained for synthesis.




Figure 1. PRISMA 2020 Flow Diagram. Source: Authors' systematic search, January–June 2025.

2.5 Coding and synthesis

Each retained study was coded along four dimensions: thematic domain (monitoring consequences, voice under algorithmic management, or intersection), research design (quantitative, qualitative, mixed, conceptual/theoretical), theoretical framework

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mobilised, and key findings relevant to the monitoring-voice-well-being nexus. Thematic synthesis followed Braun and Clarke's (2006) six-phase approach, adapted for integrative review: familiarisation with the corpus, generation of initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes against the coded data, defining and naming themes, and producing the synthesis narrative. Three superordinate themes emerged from this process and structure Section 3. Cohen's kappa was [X.XX] for thematic domain classification and [X.XX] for key findings coding. Discrepancies were resolved through discussion. An audit trail documenting all coding decisions is available from the corresponding author upon request.

2.6 Quality assessment

Consistent with the integrative review methodology (Whittemore & Knafl, 2005; Torraco, 2005), we did not apply a formal critical appraisal tool to individual studies. Integrative reviews aim to synthesise diverse evidence spanning quantitative surveys, qualitative case studies, and conceptual analyses to generate new theoretical insights, and rigid quality exclusion criteria risk narrowing the evidentiary base in ways that undermine this objective. Where study quality limitations affect the strength of specific thematic conclusions, we note this in the synthesis.

3. FINDINGS: A THEMATIC SYNTHESIS

3.1 Theme 1: The well-being costs of analytics-based and algorithmic monitoring

Thirty-one of the 63 retained studies addressed the consequences of analytics-based or algorithmic monitoring for employee well-being. The evidence converges on a consistent pattern, though with important nuances. Algorithmic monitoring is associated with reduced perceived autonomy (Kellogg et al., 2020; Parent-Rochelleau & Parker, 2022), increased work intensity and time pressure (Green, Felstead, Gallie, & Henseke, 2021), heightened psychological distress and burnout (Carter et al., 2013; Vignola, Baron, Abreu Plasencia, Hussein, & Cohen, 2023), reduced trust in management (Leicht-Deobald et al., 2019), and physical health consequences including musculoskeletal pain and accident risk in logistics settings (the AMOSH study, 2025).

The mechanism most frequently invoked in these studies is loss of control. Parent-Rochelleau and Parker (2022), in the most comprehensive theoretical treatment to date, argued that algorithmic management restructures job demands and resources in ways that systematically reduce autonomy. Their analysis identified five pathways through which algorithms alter job design: by changing the nature of tasks, by shifting control from workers to systems, by modifying social interactions, by restructuring performance expectations, and by altering the physical work environment. The well-being consequences documented in the empirical literature map closely onto these pathways.

A smaller but significant subset of studies complicates this picture. Sharma and Sharma (2017) found that analytics-based performance appraisal can increase perceived fairness when the system is transparent and consistently applied. Deng, Lu, Fan, Liu, and Xia (2025), using a multiwave dataset in conventional employment settings, reported that algorithmic monitoring and performance management can enhance workplace well-being through improved perceptions of organisational fairness, particularly when algorithmic transparency is high. These disconfirming cases share a common feature: the monitoring systems described were either transparent in their criteria, accompanied by feedback mechanisms, or implemented with some degree of worker input. The conditions under which monitoring does not damage well-being are precisely the conditions that approximate the features of employee voice.

3.2 Theme 2: Employee voice under conditions of algorithmic management

Nineteen studies addressed the status and functioning of employee voice in algorithmically managed workplaces. The dominant finding is that algorithmic management structurally constrains voice. Kellogg et al. (2020) identified three control mechanisms recommending, restricting, and recording, all of which operate unilaterally without incorporating feedback from workers. Van Zoonen, von Bonsdorff, and van der Heijden (2025) demonstrated that algorithmic surveillance erodes the trust and fairness perceptions that are preconditions for voice behaviour. Donaghey, Cullinane, Dundon, and Wilkinson (2011) had theorised this dynamic before the algorithmic turn: management can structure silence by controlling the agenda and institutional channels available for voice, a process they termed 'organised silence.' Algorithmic systems, our review suggests, automate this structuring not through managerial intention but through design choices that embed unilaterality into the system architecture.

The evidence on whether voice can effectively counteract algorithmic authority is limited but suggestive. Research on call centres has found that union-represented workers experienced monitoring as less threatening when unions had negotiated the terms of its deployment, specifically when monitoring data was used for developmental rather than disciplinary purposes. Godard (2010) showed that participative practices were associated with reduced stress among union-represented employees but not among non-union employees, suggesting that collective voice provides an institutional scaffolding that makes individual

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participation effective. Morrison (2023), reviewing a decade of voice research, called for studies that examine how voice functions under technologically mediated decision-making a call our review confirms remains largely unanswered.

3.3 Theme 3: The missing intersection

The most striking finding of this review is what is absent. Of the 63 studies retained, only four examined monitoring and voice jointly in the same analytical framework. None of the four mobilised an integrated theoretical model capable of explaining both why monitoring damages well-being and how voice attenuates that damage. The four studies that come closest are Donaghey et al.'s (2011) analysis of how management structures silence, Godard's (2010) study of participative practices and well-being, Adhami and Timur's (2025) study of trust in employee representation in European firms, and Van Zoonen et al.'s (2025) study of algorithmic surveillance and fairness in crowdwork.

Table 1. Distribution of Retained Studies by Thematic Domain (N = 63)

Thematic Domain	N	% of Total	Dominant Designs
Monitoring consequences for well-being	31	49.2%	Quantitative (18), Qualitative (8), Mixed (3), Conceptual (2)
Employee voice under algorithmic management	19	30.2%	Conceptual (7), Qualitative (7), Quantitative (4), Mixed (1)
Intersection: monitoring + voice + well-being	4	6.3%	Quantitative (2), Qualitative (1), Mixed (1)
Broader framing (analytics ethics, governance)	9	14.3%	Conceptual (5), Qualitative (3), Quantitative (1)

The near-absence of studies at the intersection (6.3% of the corpus) is not accidental; it reflects three structural conditions. The first is disciplinary fragmentation: HR analytics scholars publish primarily in management and information systems journals, while voice scholars concentrate in employment relations outlets, and the two communities rarely cite each other. The second is methodological: studying the interaction requires datasets containing establishment-level measures of both analytics practices and voice mechanisms, a combination few surveys provide. The European Company Survey (Eurofound, 2019) is a rare exception and an underexploited resource for this purpose. The third condition is conceptual: monitoring and voice have been framed as separate objects of study one a managerial technology, the other a governance mechanism rather than as interacting features of the same employment relationship.

4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSITIONS

The synthesis presented in Section 3 establishes two empirical regularities and one gap. The first regularity is that analytics-based monitoring is associated with reduced well-being through mechanisms of control loss, opacity, and intensified demands. The second is that employee voice is associated with restored procedural justice and improved well-being in managed environments. The gap is the absence of a theoretical account that connects these two regularities. We construct such an account by integrating two established theories.

4.1 JD-R theory: monitoring as demand, voice as resource

Job demands-resources theory (Bakker & Demerouti, 2017; Bakker et al., 2023) distinguishes between job demands aspects of work requiring sustained effort that carry physiological or psychological costs and job resources aspects that are functional in achieving goals, reduce demands, and stimulate growth. Two processes follow: a health-impairment process linking demands to exhaustion, and a motivational process linking resources to engagement. The theory's interaction hypothesis holds that resources buffer the impact of demands on negative outcomes (Bakker, Demerouti, & Euwema, 2005).

We classify analytics-based performance monitoring as a job demand. This classification is grounded in three properties documented in our review: opacity (criteria and weightings are frequently unclear to workers), continuity (data collection is ongoing rather than episodic), and unilaterality (outputs are generated without worker input). We classify employee voice as a job resource: direct voice provides a sense of influence, collective voice provides institutional protection, and both reduce the psychological costs of demands by restoring perceived control.

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Proposition 1. *Analytics-based performance monitoring functions as a job demand that is negatively associated with employee well-being through the health-impairment pathway.*

Proposition 2. *Employee voice, in its direct and collective forms, moderates the negative association between analytics-based monitoring and well-being, such that the association is weaker in establishments where effective voice mechanisms are present.*

P1 is not trivial. If analytics-based monitoring is perceived as fairer and more consistent than subjective managerial evaluation as Sharma and Sharma (2017) and Deng et al. (2025) suggest under conditions of transparency the net effect on well-being could be positive. Our review indicates that this positive effect obtains only under specific conditions, and that the aggregate pattern is negative. P2 is falsifiable: voice mechanisms might prove ineffective against algorithmic authority if workers perceive that neither participation nor collective bargaining can alter algorithmic outputs.

4.2 Organisational justice: the mechanism through which voice operates

JD-R theory identifies voice as a resource but does not specify the psychological mechanism through which it buffers against monitoring demands. Organisational justice theory fills this gap. Colquitt (2001), building on Thibaut and Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980), established that procedural justice the perceived fairness of decision-making processes has independent effects on attitudes, behaviours, and well-being. Among Leventhal's (1980) six criteria for procedural fairness, two are directly relevant: voice (input opportunity) and correctability (the opportunity to appeal and modify decisions). When performance is evaluated algorithmically, both criteria are structurally compromised. Employee voice mechanisms create parallel channels of procedural justice that compensate for this deficit.

Proposition 3. *The moderating effect of employee voice on the monitoring-well-being relationship operates through procedural justice: voice restores the procedural fairness conditions (input opportunity and correctability) that analytics-based monitoring structurally undermines.*

4.3 Differentiated effects: direct versus collective voice

Our review suggests that direct and collective voice function differently in algorithmically managed environments. Direct voice (individual participation) depends on managerial discretion. Collective voice (union representation, works councils) is institutionally embedded and legally backed. Godard's (2010) finding that participative practices improved well-being only among union-represented workers implies that collective voice provides the structural legitimacy that makes direct participation effective.

Proposition 4. *Collective employee voice (formal representation) is a stronger moderator of the monitoring-well-being relationship than direct voice (individual participation), because collective voice provides institutional enforceability that individual participation lacks.*

We note that P4 rests on the thinnest empirical base among our five propositions. Godard's (2010) study predates the current algorithmic management context by over a decade, and direct evidence comparing the buffering effects of collective versus direct voice in analytics-monitored workplaces does not yet exist. This makes P4 a particularly high-priority target for future empirical testing.

4.4 Institutional context: the cross-level dimension

The comparative employment relations literature establishes that voice mechanisms vary systematically across national institutional contexts (Brewster, 2006; Hall & Soskice, 2001). In coordinated market economies, codetermination rights give worker representatives formal authority over the introduction of new monitoring technologies (Aloisi & Gramano, 2019). In liberal market economies, voice is weaker and more management-dependent. Bechter et al. (2022) found that institutional variation explained some variance in analytics adoption. We expect it to explain more variance in the moderating effect of voice.

Proposition 5. *The moderating effect of collective voice is contingent on the national institutional framework: it is stronger in coordinated market economies, where collective voice is legally mandated and institutionally supported, than in liberal market economies, where it depends primarily on firm-level managerial choice.*

4.5 Boundary conditions and alternative pathways

The propositions above specify the conditions under which voice attenuates monitoring's well-being costs. Theoretical precision requires equal attention to the conditions under which it would not. We identify two boundary conditions and one paradoxical possibility.

Surveillance saturation. When monitoring intensity exceeds a threshold continuous keystroke logging, real-time location tracking, automated emotional analysis voice mechanisms may become functionally irrelevant. If the monitoring system is so

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pervasive that workers perceive themselves as comprehensively surveilled regardless of participatory processes, the procedural justice restoration that voice provides may be insufficient. This implies a non-linear interaction: voice buffers monitoring at moderate intensities but may lose its moderating force at extreme levels.

Performative voice. Voice mechanisms exist on a spectrum from genuine influence to symbolic presence. When participation schemes are perceived as managerial rituals ‘paper voice’ they may fail to restore procedural justice because workers recognise that their input does not affect algorithmic parameters. The quality of voice, not merely its presence, determines its buffering capacity.

Paradoxical amplification. Participatory processes designed to discuss monitoring practices may inadvertently increase workers’ awareness of and anxiety about surveillance. A works council meeting that details the scope of analytics-based monitoring may make that monitoring more psychologically salient, temporarily amplifying rather than attenuating its well-being costs. This paradox does not invalidate the buffering hypothesis sustained voice should reduce costs over time as workers gain genuine influence but it cautions against expecting immediate effects.

We considered and rejected two alternative theoretical pathways. Psychological contract theory (Rousseau, 1995) could frame analytics-based monitoring as a breach of relational expectations, but it lacks the demand-resource architecture needed to explain the buffering mechanism. Exit-voice-loyalty theory (Hirschman, 1970) provides an alternative voice framework, but its binary treatment of voice as a substitute for exit does not accommodate the institutional complexity of collective representation in conventional employment. JD-R theory combined with organisational justice theory offers a more complete explanatory architecture for the specific dynamic we theorise.




Figure 2. Integrative Conceptual Framework: Monitoring, Voice, and Well-Being.

5. DISCUSSION

5.1 Theoretical contributions

This review makes three theoretical contributions. The first is diagnostic. By conducting the first systematic review that treats monitoring, voice, and well-being as a unified domain, we have identified a gap that was not visible from within any single literature. The fact that only four of 63 studies in our corpus examined monitoring and voice jointly reflects a structural fragmentation driven by disciplinary boundaries, methodological constraints, and conceptual compartmentalisation.

The second contribution is integrative. The framework combines JD-R theory and organisational justice theory in the specific context of analytics-based HRM. JD-R theory provides the demand-resource architecture; organisational justice theory specifies the mechanism. Their integration is generative, not additive, because it produces predictions particularly P3 and P4 that neither theory generates independently. The boundary conditions developed in Section 4.5 specify the conditions under which the framework’s predictions would not hold, providing the falsifiability conditions that distinguish a theoretical contribution from a descriptive summary.

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The third contribution is propositional. The five formal propositions translate the review findings into a testable architecture. P1 through P3 are testable at the firm level with establishment-level survey data. P4 and P5 require cross-national data or within-country institutional variation.

5.2 Practical implications

If our propositions hold, organisations deploying analytics-based performance monitoring face a clear choice. They can implement monitoring as a unilateral managerial instrument and absorb the well-being costs: absenteeism, turnover, disengagement, occupational health risks. Or they can embed monitoring within an infrastructure of employee voice: direct participation in defining performance criteria and interpreting analytics outputs, collective representation with genuine influence over the design and governance of monitoring systems. The evidence from our review, particularly the disconfirming cases (Deng et al., 2025; Sharma & Sharma, 2017), indicates that the conditions under which monitoring does not harm well-being closely resemble the conditions that voice mechanisms create.

For policymakers, these implications align with the regulatory trajectory of the EU AI Act, which imposes transparency and consultation obligations on organisations deploying high-risk AI systems in employment contexts. Our framework suggests that these obligations function as procedural justice channels whose legal mandating may attenuate the well-being costs of algorithmic management.

5.3 Limitations

Four limitations require acknowledgement. First, despite following PRISMA guidelines and searching three major databases, we cannot guarantee comprehensive coverage. Grey literature, non-English publications, and studies using terminology outside our search strings may have been missed. Second, the heterogeneity of the retained studies limits the precision of cross-study comparisons. A meta-analysis with standardised effect sizes would provide stronger evidence. Third, our propositions remain untested. The framework is grounded in synthesised evidence but has not been subjected to empirical validation. Fourth, the review protocol was not prospectively registered with PROSPERO, which limits protection against the perception of post-hoc methodological adjustments, though the pre-specified protocol is fully documented in Section 2.

5.4 Research agenda

Three research directions follow with particular urgency. First, establishment-level quantitative studies should test P1 and P2 using secondary data that contains measures of analytics use, voice mechanisms, and well-being indicators. The European Company Survey (Eurofound, 2019), which Bechter et al. (2022) used to study adoption determinants, contains variables that could be repurposed for this objective.

Second, qualitative longitudinal research should investigate how workers experience the introduction of analytics-based monitoring over time, and how voice mechanisms shape those experiences. Ethnographic studies in matched pairs of establishments (with and without effective voice) would be particularly valuable, following Bailey and Barley (2020).

Third, comparative institutional research should exploit the natural experiments created by the EU AI Act's staggered implementation across member states, providing a quasi-experimental setting for testing P5.

6. CONCLUSION

The question this article has pursued is not whether organisations should use HR analytics to monitor performance. That question has been settled by practice. The question is whether anyone is listening to the people the analytics describe.

Our systematic review of 63 studies reveals a field that has generated substantial knowledge about the costs of algorithmic monitoring and the value of employee voice, but that has failed to connect the two. The monitoring literature documents harm. The voice literature documents a remedy. Neither has recognised the other. The framework we propose, integrating JD-R theory and organisational justice theory, provides the conceptual architecture for that connection. Analytics-based monitoring is a job demand that generates well-being costs through opacity, continuity, and unilaterality. Employee voice is a job resource that attenuates those costs by restoring procedural justice specifically the conditions of input and correctability that algorithmic authority removes.

The policy and practice implications are considerable. If voice functions as we have theorised, then deploying analytics-based monitoring without accompanying voice infrastructure is not a neutral managerial decision. It is a choice to accept avoidable well-being costs. Organisations that invest in voice alongside analytics do not merely comply with emerging regulation; they protect the human conditions under which monitoring can be sustained without erosion.

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Bechter et al. (2022) showed what drives organisations to monitor. This article asks what protects the people being monitored. The answer, grounded in a decade of evidence and two established theories, is voice. When the algorithm watches and someone listens, the employment relationship absorbs datafication without fracturing. When no one listens, the monitoring does not merely measure; it erodes.

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