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The Effect of Institutional Ownership, Independent Auditor Tenure, Audit Committee Tenure on Earnings Management in Palm Oil Plantation Companies Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange

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ABSTRACT: This research aims toanalyze the influence of institutional ownership on earnings management, analyze the influence of independent auditor tenure on earnings management, analyze the influence of audit committee tenure on earnings management, and describe the variables of earnings management, institutional ownership, independent auditor tenure and audit committee tenure. The data in this research is time series data in the form of Annual Report data for 5 years, from 2018-2022, so the data in this research is 60 pieces of data. The data analysis technique uses multiple regression analysis. The results of the analysis show that Institutional Ownership has a negative effect on Earnings Management. This shows that greater institutional ownership in a company can usually have more access to the company's internal information, including control processes and financial reporting. This can allow them to more quickly detect or respond to suspicious earnings management practices. Independent Auditor Tenure has no effect on Earnings Management. This shows that the tenure of an independent auditor cannot influence earnings management practices within a company. Auditors in carrying out their audits must continue to carry out them in accordance with procedures and must improve the quality of their audits so that the audited financial reports can reflect their true value. Audit Committee Tenure does not affect Profit Management. This shows that the tenure of the audit committee in carrying out supervision cannot influence the existence of earnings management in a company. In carrying out its supervision, the audit committee must be independent of management both in reporting its performance results and in selecting an independent external auditor.

KEYWORDS: Institutional Ownership, Independent Auditor Tenure, Audit Committee Tenure, Profit Management

I. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays business is no longer limited by national boundaries in the era of globalization. Stakeholders need accounting standards that are universal and comparable across countries. Globalized international financial markets demand harmonization of global accounting standards. Potential investors want accurate and transparent information to make informed decisions (Elshandidy, 2022). Generally accepted accounting standards will make it easier to compare financial reports from various countries that apply different accounting rules.

In the 1960s, representatives from professional accounting institutions in Canada, England and the United States together formed the Accountants International Study Group (AISG) with the aim of exploring the alignment of accounting and auditing standards in these countries. In 1972, at the World Accounting Professional Congress held in Sydney every five years, AISG members discussed the proposal for an International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and was successfully established in England on June 23 1973 with representatives from professional accountants from England, Canada and the United States. , France, West Germany, Australia, Japan, the Netherlands and Mexico which aims to develop accounting standards, encourage acceptance of these standards, and promote harmonization of accounting procedures and standards globally. IASC produces International Accounting Standards (IAS) (Sinatra et al., 2022). In 2000, the IASC underwent a shake-up due to the formation of the IASC Foundation (IASCF), which is responsible for the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC). The main task of the IASB is to develop accounting and financial reporting standards known as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which integrate standards previously known as IAS (Sinatra et al., 2022).

IFRS applies toimprove the quality of accounting information. Effective financial reports are able to convey information that is reliable, comparable, relevant and easy to understand for its users. The information in financial reports reflects a comprehensive picture of the financial condition of each entity (Gea & Putra, 2022). The transparency of a company's financial reporting is measured based on the extent to which the information presented makes it easier for users to understand the company's financial performance and condition. (Kuraesin & Yadiati, 2021). However, several leading international companies such as Enron, Tyco International, Worldcom, Freddie Mac, Global Crossing, Cendant, Adelphia, and AIG have been involved in manipulating financial reports. This scandal attracts attention in the era of globalization. In Indonesia, several large companies face similar practices. One example is PT Kimia Farma Tbk (KAEF) in the 2001 financial year reporting a net profit of 132 billion, but the Ministry of BUMN and Bapepam assessed that there was an element of engineering, so it was restated because a net profit mark-up was identified (Kencana, 2015). Second, PT Bank Bukopin Tbk revised its 2016 financial report. Significant changes in 2016 profit, which was previously recorded at IDR 1.08 trillion, were recorded again at IDR 183.53 billion. The biggest decrease was in the portion of fees and commissions income which was income from credit cards. This income fell from 1.06 trillion to 317.88 billion. Apart from that, revisions also occurred in the financing of the subsidiary of Bank Syariah Bukopin (BSB) related to the addition of the balance of reserves for impairment losses for certain debtors so that the burden of provisions for impairment losses on financial assets was revised to increase from 649.05 billion to 797.65 billion, which caused the company's burden to increase. 148.6 billion (Banjarnahor, 2018). Third, it is known in the 2018 financial report, PT Garuda Indonesia (GIAA) recorded a net profit, one of which was supported by the collaboration between PT Garuda Indonesia Garuda and PT Mahata Aero Terknologi with a contract for the next 15 years with a value of US$ 239.94 million or around IDR 3.48 trillion, but GIAA recorded this value in the first year and was recognized as income and included in other income so that the company which previously made a loss became profitable (Sandria, 2021). Apart from that, PT Tiga Pilar Asia Food (AISA) carried out a restatement of its 2017 financial report due to allegations of manipulation by previous management. Previously, the company reported a loss of 551.9 billion but in the financial report that has been presented again it recorded a higher loss of 5.23 trillion during 2017. A report from the public accounting firm Ernst & Young (EY) revealed several indications of bubbles, the evidence is in accounts receivable, inventory and fixed assets. Significant differences can also be seen in sales and profit before interest, tax, depreciation,and amortization (EBITDA). For example, trade receivables in the previous version of the financial report were recorded at IDR 2.11 trillion, but in the restatement results they were only IDR 485.71 billion, indicating an increase of up to IDR 1.63 trillion (Fajrian, 2020). Furthermore, PT Hanson Internasional Tbk in 2016 was found to have manipulated its financial reports by recognizing sales of ready-to-build lots worth IDR 732 billion as income using the full accrual method. However, the Sale and Purchase Agreement (PPJB) for ready-to-build plots at Serpong Kencana Housing on July 14 2016 was not disclosed by the company to the auditor who examined its financial statements (Idris et al., 2020). The findings in the case above are evidence that financial reporting in the private sector and State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) is still weak and the quality of reporting is still low. The main factor causing the low quality of financial reporting in this country is the lack of effectiveness in corporate governance. This is proven by research by the Consultant for Law and Social Association (CLSA) showing that the score for implementing corporate governance in several Asian countries places Indonesia with a score of 34. as the lowest in the Asian region (Kuraesin & Yadiati, 2021).

One of the crucial aspects in financial reports is profit, because the indicator for assessing company and management performance is profit, so that the company tries to achieve predetermined targets. Financial Accounting Standards (SAK) provide flexibility for selecting accounting methods in preparing financial reports, thereby allowing each company to generate different profits. For example, the method applied in calculating the cost of goods sold, determining the estimated economic life for the allocation of the acquisition price of fixed assets, amortization of the value of intangible assets, calculating the percentage of losses on receivables, and others that can be concluded as earnings management, due to the selection of the method used. different (Sulistyanto, 2018:10).

Earnings management can be explained through agency theory which causes information asymmetry, where owners have limited information about the company and cannot always supervise managers. Meanwhile, managers can act according to their wishes without maximizing the owner's welfare (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Earnings management occurs due to the inability to implement governance principles designed to increase business success and transparency, so companies must ensure that effective governance principles are applied comprehensively in all areas of their operations. Consistency in implementing good governance practices produces good financial reports and reflects the company's healthy fundamental performance.

In this research, the quality of governance is seen from three variables, namely institutional ownership, independent auditor tenure, and audit committee tenure. Institutional ownership reflects majority ownership by professional institutions with access to corporate strategic information, supporting stronger oversight mechanisms in the interests of shareholders(Mahmoodi et al., 2023). Independent auditor tenure refers to the period of time during which the same auditor continuously provides audit services to the same client Dewita and Erinos (2023). Meanwhile, audit committee tenure shows the committee's length of service in carrying out supervision, which directly influences the effectiveness of internal control and risk control within the company. The audit committee can carry out supervision in controlling company activities, so it is important to improve the quality of corporate governance through the audit committee. According to Ardyanti (2023), audit committee tenure refers to the duration of time that audit committee members serve in their positions.

The researcher's background in choosing the oil palm plantation industry in Indonesia was chosen because it has been involved for more than a hundred years and continues to show significant development and growth. In fact, in 2022 palm oil production will increase from the previous year to 46.82 million tons. So it can be concluded that the oil palm plantation industry is considered sustainable and promising with bright prospects for the future. Not only in the upstream agribusiness section, the downstream section also continues to develop to produce innovative products to meet domestic and international market demand. Currently, the government is considering changing the use of palm oil into an environmentally friendly renewable energy source (green energy).(Limandra et al., 2023).

In particular, agricultural commodities such as palm oil are often affected by uncertainty or price variations (Sari et al, 2023). The palm oil industry has certain characteristics such as fluctuating commodity prices and production costs which can vary greatly. Companies may utilize flexibility in accounting methods or estimation policies to adjust financial statements according to desired profitability.

In the research of Ali et al. (2024) companies with large institutional ownership have low discretionary accruals. However, in research by Cinthya et al. (2022) the level of institutional ownership is not significant in monitoring earnings fraud. Hermatika and Triani (2022) highlight that audit time limits can prevent auditors from understanding the company in depth, while Nwoye et al (2021) the length of time an auditor works with one client causes increased familiarity with the client, which creates space for earnings management. Braswell (2018) found that the length of the audit committee's tenure was quite effective in reducing management's tendency to delay or minimize discretionary spending to increase revenue, in contrast to Mahmoodi et al. (2023) who do not see the same effect on financial report transparency.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Agency Theory

Agency theory explains interactions in which principals give orders to agents in providing services. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that an agency relationship occurs when the principal uses an agent to provide services and give them the right to make decisions. The principal is an individual or entity who owns shares or makes investments who delegates the authority to make decisions to agents, namely company management. Agency conflict arises because managers do not always comply with the wishes of shareholders, resulting in agency costs. Accounting reporting mechanisms can reduce conflict by providing balanced information between principals and agents. Agency relationships create conflict when the goals of capital owners (maximum profits) and managers (maximum welfare and compensation) conflict, giving rise to a conflict of interest between owners and managers as agents (Budiarti & Sulistyowati, 2014).

B. Profit management

Earnings management involves management strategies for managing the company's financial results with the aim of achieving desired profits and reporting them (Scott, 2015:444). According to Sulistyanto (2018: 141), managers use earnings management to deceive other parties who use this information for strategic decision making, while gaining personal benefits from mistakes made by stakeholders. The more errors that occur, the higher the profits obtained by the manager. The impact of this information manipulation is detrimental to owners, investors, creditors, the government and the public who are not directly connected to the company. Therefore, academics have begun to develop models for identifying and detecting earnings management practices. One of the well-known approaches to detecting earnings management is aggregate accrual, which utilizes the accrual accounting basis and all parts of the financial report to identify financial manipulation (Sulistyanto, 2018: 141).

C. Corporate Governance

Corporate governance is a series of interaction rules between interested parties such as shareholders, third parties and creditors. The aim is to improve the company's financial performance, with a focus on harmonization between social and economic goals, as well as between individual and group interests within the company (Hidayati & Fidiana, 2017). Corporate governance aims to ensure companies operate with honesty and openness, which ultimately builds trust from stakeholders and the continuity of the company's business. According to Febrianti & Uswati (2019), corporate governance includes the relationship between shareholders and management. Management, as agents acting on behalf of the principal, is responsible for leading and maintaining the stability of the company, but they can often pursue personal interests (opportunism).

D. Institutional Ownership

Institutional ownership is when a majority of professional shareholders own shares of a company, gaining strategic access to internal information. This encourages increased monitoring for the benefit of shareholders and arouses investors' desire to invest. Maintaining institutional ownership is important because institutional investors have a diverse investment base (Mahmoodi et al., 2023). Long-term share ownership of institutions such as banks, investment companies, insurance and other institutions allows these institutions to communicate directly with company managers. (Holly et al., 2023). Institutional ownership is measured by the number of institutional shares divided by the number of shares outstanding.

E. Independent Auditor Tenure

Independent auditor tenure is the term of office of an independent auditor in a company (Mahmoodi et al., 2023). The term of office of an independent auditor, in this case the services of an accountant from a Public Accounting Firm, is limited by ministerial regulations, this is done to maintain the independence of the auditor so that he or she remains objective in providing accounting services in auditing the client's financial statements. Republic of Indonesia Government Regulation no. 20 of 2015 concerning Public Accounting Practices article 11, stipulates that public accountants can provide general audit services for an entity's financial statements for five consecutive financial years. After this period ends, public accountants must wait two consecutive financial years before they can return to providing audit services on the entity's historical financial information. A longer auditor's tenure can influence two factors that ultimately influence audit quality, namely independence and competence (DeAngelo, 1981). In terms of independence, a longer audit tenure can reduce the risk of losing auditor independence due to emotional closeness to clients and the possibility of less objective assumptions (Indahsari et al., 2023). On the other hand, in terms of competency, a longer auditor tenure can increase the auditor's knowledge about the complexity of the client's business, which in turn can increase the auditor's ability to detect material errors in financial reports (Johnson et al., 2002).

F. Audit Committee Tenure

Audit committee tenure is the length of time the audit committee carries out its role (Mahmoodi et al., 2023). Based on decision number KEP-643/BL/2012 of the Chairman of the Capital Market and Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency regarding the formation and work guidelines of the Audit Committee, the audit committee is a body formed by the Board of Commissioners which is obliged to assist in carrying out the functions and duties of the Board of Commissioners. In the Articles of Association, members of the Audit Committee have a term of office that does not exceed the term of office of the Board of Commissioners. The audit committee is re-elected only for one further period. According to Braswell (2018), extending the audit committee's term of office increases the audit committee's ability to identify and minimize the use of opportunistic accounting choices by management. Based on the choice of accounting policies available in the accounting system, managers tend to choose policies that suit their personal goals (Priantinah, 2009). The audit committee's term of office is taken from the average number of years they have currently served.

G. Research Hypothesis

H_1 : Institutional ownership influences earnings management.
H_2 : Tenure of independent auditors influences earnings management.
H_3 : Audit committee tenure influences earnings management.

III. RESEARCH METHODS

A. Research design

This research will use a quantitative approach, which focuses on data in the form of numbers, from the collection process to the presentation of research results. The method applied is a causality research design, aimed at testing the effect, influence or relationship of the independent variable to the dependent variable (Chandrarin, 2017:98).

B. Population and Sampling Techniques

Population is a set of elements with special characteristics that can be used to draw conclusions. (Chandrarin, 2017:125). In this research, the population used was companies in the primary consumer goods sector, plantation and food crop industries, focusing on palm oil companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2018-2022. A sample is a group of subjects that represents the entire population (Chandrarin, 2017:125). In determining this sample, a purposive sampling technique will be used.

Purposive sampling is a sample selection method by referring to criteria relevant to the research variables. From the results of the population sample, the remaining number of samples to be tested in this research is 12 companies. The data in this research is time series data in the form of Annual Report data for 5 years, from 2018-2022, so the data in this research is 60 pieces of data.

C. Data analysis technique

The data analysis technique in this research uses descriptive statistical analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. Multiple linear regression analysis is a method for evaluating the linear relationship between independent variables and dependent variables.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1) Multiple Linear Regression Analysis

Regression analysis was carried out to assess the magnitude of the influence of independent variables such as institutional ownership, tenure of the independent auditor, and tenure of the audit committee on the dependent variable, namely earnings management practices. Testing the following variables uses the equation:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X1_{it} + \beta_2 X2_{it} + \beta_3 X3_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Table 1. Multiple Linear Regression Test Results

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients B	Unstandardized Coefficients Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	2,030	,358		5,666	,000
	Institutional Ownership	-.020	,004	-.555	-4,997	,000
	Independent Auditor Tenure	,040	,093	,047	,425	,672
	Audit Committee Tenure	-.015	,038	-.044	-.396	,693

a. Dependent Variable: Profit Management

Source: Data processed using SPSS 26

Based on the table above, the equation obtained for use in research is as follows:

$$Y = 2.030 - 0.20\ X1 + 0.04\ X2 - 0.015 X3 + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Information:

Y :Profit management

$X1$:Institutional Ownership

$X2$:Independent Auditor Tenure

$X3$:Audit Committee Tenure

i : Cross-section(Company)

t :Time-series(2018 – 2022)

From the multiple linear regression equation, it can be seen the magnitude of the influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable, namely as follows:

1) α = 2.030
   If the variables X1,
2) β1 = -0.020
   The regression coefficient of -0.020 for institutional ownership (X1) indicates that every one unit increase in the institutional ownership variable will reduce earnings management by -0.020 units, assuming the variables of independent auditor tenure (X2) and audit committee tenure (X3) remain constant.
3) β2 = 0.040
   The regression coefficient value is 0.040 on independent auditor tenure (X2), this shows that for each independent auditor tenure variable increases by 1 unit, earnings management will increase by 0.040 units assuming the institutional ownership variables (X1) and audit committee tenure (X3) remain constant.

4) β3 = -0.015

   The regression coefficient value is -0.015 on audit committee tenure (X3), this shows that for every time the audit committee financial tenure variable increases by 1 unit, earnings management will decrease by -0.015 units assuming the institutional ownership variable (X1) and the independent auditor tenure variable (X2) fixed.

2) Hypothesis testing

There are 3 tests carried out in hypothesis testing, namely as follows:

1) Model Feasibility Test (F Test)

The F test is used to evaluate the suitability of the model whether multiple linear regression is appropriate or appropriate. This test criterion shows the magnitude of the F value and the significance value of p. If the analysis results show a p value ≤ 0.05, then the regression equation model is significant at a significance level of 5%, so it can be concluded that the model formed in the multiple linear regression equation is correct.

Table 2. F Test Results

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	8.123	3	2,708	8,689	,000b
	Residual	17,452	56	,312		
	Total	25,575	59			

a. Dependent Variable: Profit Management

b. Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Tenure, Institutional Ownership, Independent Auditor Tenure

Source: Data processed using SPSS 26

From this table, it can be seen that the significance p value is ≤ 0.05, which indicates that the multiple linear regression equation model formed is appropriate for further testing.

2) Determination Coefficient Test (AdjustedR^2)

The purpose of the coefficient of determination test(R^2) measures the ability of each model to explain the dependent variable. A high coefficient of determination value is used as a marker of a good quality empirical model (Chandrarin, 2017: 141).

Table 3. Determination Coefficient Test Results (R^2)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.564a	,318	,281	.558243

a. Predictors: (Constant), Audit Committee Tenure, Institutional Ownership, Independent Auditor Tenure

Source: Data processed using SPSS 26

Based on the table above, the dependent variable can be explained by 28.1% by independent variables, including institutional ownership, independent auditor tenure, and audit committee tenure. The remaining 71.9% is explained by other variables not included in this research model.

3) Variable Significance Test (t Test)

Variable significance test, testing how much influence each independent variable has on the dependent variable individually, the aim is to evaluate the influence of institutional ownership, independent auditor tenure, and audit committee tenure on earnings management. The significance level of the partial parameter test (t test) is less than 0.05.

Table 4. t test results

Coefficientsa

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	2,030	,358		5,666	,000
	Institutional Ownership	-.020	,004	-.555	-4,997	,000
	Independent Auditor Tenure	,040	,093	,047	,425	,672
	Audit Committee Tenure	-.015	,038	-.044	-.396	,693

a. Dependent Variable: Profit Management

Source: Data processed using SPSS 26

Based on the results of the t test above, it can be described as follows:

1) Institutional Ownership

   The coefficient of the influence of institutional ownership on earnings management is -0.555 with a significance value of 0.000. The conclusion is that there is a significant negative influence of institutional ownership on earnings management.

2) Independent Auditor Tenure

   The coefficient of influence of independent auditor tenure on earnings management is 0.047 with a significance value of 0.672. The conclusion is that there is no influence of independent auditor tenure on earnings management.

3) Audit Committee Tenure

   The coefficient of influence of independent auditor tenure on earnings management is -0.044 with a significance value of 0.693. The conclusion is that there is no influence of audit committee tenure on earnings management.

3) DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH RESULTS

1) Institutional Ownership influences Earnings Management

Based on research results, institutional ownership has an influence on earnings management. Judging from the results of the beta coefficient of -0.555 and a significance value of less than 5%, it shows that increasing institutional ownership can reduce earnings management significantly.When professional shareholders own a majority of a company's stock they typically have more access to the company's internal information, including control processes and financial reporting. This can allow them to more quickly detect or respond to suspicious earnings management practices.This strengthens previous research conducted by Ali et al (2024) which shows that companies with higher institutional ownership are more likely to show lower discretionary accruals. In line with the research results of Utami et al (2021), if the percentage of institutional share ownership increases, it will reduce the opportunity for earnings management and if the percentage of institutional share ownership decreases, there will be a greater opportunity for earnings management. This is different from the results of Perdana's (2019) research which shows that institutional ownership has a positive effect on managementearnings and is different from research by Mahmoodi et al (2023) which found that institutional ownership reduces the quality of accounting information produced by calculating earnings management.So based on this research the hypothesis is declared accepted.

2) Independent Auditor Tenure influences Earnings Management

Based on the research results, independent auditor tenure has no influence on earnings management. Judging from the results of the beta coefficient of 0.047 and the significance value of more than 5%, it shows that independent auditor tenure has no influence on earnings management. This shows that the length of time an auditor has provided services to a client does not affect the earnings management practices carried out by the client. Similar results were found in research by Angela et al (2019), Wijaya and Susilandari (2022) who stated that there was no significant influence between audit partner tenure and the resulting audit quality which was calculated using the Modified Jones Model of discretionary accruals and Mahmoodi et al (2023) which The results show that there is no influence of independent auditor tenure on the quality of accounting information as a proxy for earnings management. The results of this study are not in accordance with the hypothesis referred toNwoye et al (2021)which states that the longer the auditor's engagement in the company can create space for management to carry out earnings management. So based on this research the hypothesis is rejected.

3) Audit Committee Tenure influences Earnings Management

Based on the research results, audit committee tenure has no influence on earnings management. Judging from the results of the beta coefficient of -0.044 and the significance value of more than 5%, it shows that audit committee tenure has no influence on earnings management. This shows that the length of time the audit committee supervises management does not affect the earnings management practices carried out by management.The results of this research are in line with research by Mahmoodi et al (2023) which shows that there is no effect of audit committee tenure on the quality of accounting information as a proxy for earnings management.. Research conducted by Hidayat et al (2021) shows that there is no influence of the audit committee's tenure on real earnings management. The results of this study are not in accordance with the hypothesis referred to Braswell (2018), who shows that longer audit committee terms are quite effective in reducing management's tendency to delay or minimize discretionary spending to increase revenue. mSo based on this research the hypothesis is rejected.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Institutional Ownership has a negative effect on Earnings Management. This shows that greater institutional ownership in a company can usually have more access to the company's internal information, including control processes and financial reporting. This can allow them to more quickly detect or respond to suspicious earnings management practices.

Independent Auditor Tenure has no effect on Earnings Management. This shows that the tenure of an independent auditor cannot influence earnings management practices within a company. Auditors in carrying out their audits must continue to carry out them in accordance with procedures and must improve the quality of their audits so that the audited financial reports can reflect their true value.

Audit Committee Tenure does not affect Earnings Management. This shows that the tenure of the audit committee in carrying out supervision cannot influence the existence of earnings management in a company. In carrying out its supervision, the audit committee must be independent of management both in reporting its performance results and in selecting an independent external auditor.

The results of the descriptive analysis of the earnings management variable have an average of 0.693 with a standard deviation value of 0.658, a minimum value of 0.007 and a maximum value of 2,780. The institutional ownership variable has an average of 68,439 with a standard deviation value of 18,484, a minimum value of 5.87 and a maximum value of 92.40. The independent auditor tenure variable has an average of 1.72 with a standard deviation value of 0.783, a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 3. The audit committee tenure variable has an average of 3.42 with a standard deviation value of 1.898, a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 7.

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